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Envisioning Amazonia: Geospatial technology, legality 





Among the many tragedies of the commons that afflict the contemporary 
world, the lingering death of the Amazonian rainforest is particularly 
emblematic. Forest-loss, argue Lövbrand and Stripple (2006),‘re-
territorialises’ ‘global’ narratives of climate change, mapping them onto 
specific geographically-bounded forests. Brazil’s tropical forest remains the 
largest in the world and home to some of its richest ecosystems. The efforts 
to ‘sustainably’ manage this forest could therefore be seen as 
representative of the global ‘sustainability’ drive as a whole. Speaking at 
the turn of the century, US Vice-President Al Gore (1998) argued that 
information technologies such as ‘high resolution satellite imagery of the 
planet, digital maps, and economic, social, and demographic information’ 
cannot but bring about better ‘decision-making for a sustainable future, 
land-use planning, agricultural, and crisis management’. Indeed, the new 
digital infrastructures centered around satellite imaging and Geographical 
Information Systems (GIS) are still thought to make possible what 
Annelise Riles (2000: 179) calls a ‘governance by fact’. At the same time 
anthropologists have highlighted what Harvey and Knox (2012) call ‘the 
enchantments of infrastructure’ noting that infrastructures rarely, if ever, 
fulfill the demands, promises and expectations projected onto them. 
Arguably, one common symptom of such ‘enchantment’ is the tendency, as 
Wendy Chun (2006: 9) puts it, to accept ‘[techno-]propaganda as 
technological reality, and [to conflate] possibility with probability’. We 
therefore need to focus on how infrastructures function in practice rather 
than merely on how they are supposed to function.  
The satellite en-visioning of Amazonia is instructive in this respect. 
In many ways the ‘jungle’ appears to stand, literally as well as 
metaphorically, as the Other of order and organization. It can be rendered 
manage-able only insofar as its opacity is penetrated and is made known in 
particular ways. The article therefore sets out to address a number of 
interrelated questions: How do the new digital infrastructures of 
deforestation detection impinge upon, and are enacted as, social relations? 
What are the forms of visibility and legality they enact? Empirically, the 
paper is based upon an on-going 10-year ‘multi-sited’ (Marcus, 1995) 
ethnographic study of the practices and technologies for monitoring the 
forest. We have sought to understand the different ways that the systems 
(and the labours) of imaging and administering Amazonia are being 
performed in a broad range of empirical settings. From sites where digital 
infrastructures are operated and maintained – such as Brasília (where the 
Ministry of the Environment and IBAMA the Federal, Environmental 
Agency) are located and São José dos Campos where INPE (the Institute 
for Space Research) is based - to the forest clearings along the 
‘deforestation arc’ (see fig.1). To this end, the research utilized a number of 
methods ranging from interviews - with practitioners, INPE scientists, 
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officials and relevant policy actors (over 143 formal interviews conducted 
plus many more informal conversations) - to the ethnographic observation 
of ranger patrols of potential deforestation sites as well as the analysis of 
satellite data, agency reports and other forms of institutional 
documentation. The themes of this article emerged from the data through 




Figure 1: The research sites 
 
The rest of the article is organized as follows. The first section outlines the 
sociopolitical developments, forces and discourses out of which the present 
digital infrastructures for envisioning Amazonia have historically emerged. 
We then shift our focus from the political and scientific ‘centres of 
calculation’ (Latour, 1987) to the farms and ranches along the still 
relentlessly advancing ‘deforestation arc’ where the mundane work of 
deforestation detection is (or fails to be) performed. The final sections of 
the paper consider some of the implications of the argument developed 
here for the understanding of infrastructures as sites where contests over 
notions of government, development, conservation and the public good are 
routinely waged. 
 
The view from the top 
 
In Seeing Like a State, Scott (1998) notes that states tend to develop 
distinctive ways of viewing their territories, ways that are constitutive of the 
manner wherein threats are framed, opportunities identified and schemes of 
improvement devised (Zukosky, 2007; Li, 1999; Miller and Rose, 1990). Thus, 
data infrastructures could and should be understood as apparatuses of 
governmentality (Foucault, 2010) that reveal, inter alia, the ‘forms of political 
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rationality that underlie technological projects’ (Larkin, 2013:328; Collier, 
2011). The envisioning of Amazonia reflects this pattern. No other major 
tropical forest in the world has been monitored so intensively, for so long and 
for such different reasons. For the military regimes which -in the wake of the 
1964 coup- initiated this monitoring the Amazon presented urgent problems 
of security and sovereignity. The opacity of the rainforest, it was feared, 
prevented the state from knowing whether settlers from other countries might 
be infiltrating remote parts of the region. The regime’s ‘National Integration 
Plan’ therefore highlighted the colonization of the Amazon as a national 
priority in need of a reliable database. The newly created Institute for Space 
Research (INPE), a powerful symbol of Brazil’s modernity and technological 
prowess, was thus assigned with developing the remote monitoring systems 
necessary inter alia for ‘providing information to improve the process of 
occupation of the Amazon’ (Novaes et al, 1980:10). As an INPE scientist 
explained,  
‘The lack of knowledge was considerable as was the fear of 
international greed as indicated by the slogan ‘integrate [the Amazon] 
to avoid losing it’....[So] from the beginning, INPE had the mission to 
address this issue…via remote sensing.’ (Interviewee/#35/2007)  
 
As Amazonian colonization gathered pace, it became increasingly important 
to be able to centrally monitor just how much of the forest was in fact being 
converted into farms and cattle ranches. To meet this need, INPE and the 
Brazilian Institute for Forestry Development (IBDF) generated a number of 
Amazon-wide deforestation assessments. Initial results were not encouraging 
for state planners. Alarmed by data indicating low deforestation rates (De 
Mello, 2006), they began to re-evaluate the conduct of the project. The focus 
on small settlers now appeared to have resulted in a scattershot approach to 
Amazonian colonization and to be in urgent need of rationalization. As a 
result by the mid-1970s there was a change of emphasis away from small 
farmers and towards big corporations and private investors. A change that is 
also indicative of a shift in the way that Amazonian forest was problematized: 
as anxieties regarding foreign intrusion ebbed, concerns regarding 
development came to the fore.  
Whilst there was widespread conviction that Amazonia was rich in 
natural resources no-one could be sure what these resources were, where they 
were located, or how they might be extracted (Gonçalves, 2005). Remote 
sensing technologies, such as airborne radar and satellite images were 
therefore obvious solutions in this quest to ‘separate myth from 
reality’(Pereira, 1971:90). Technologically generated visualizations became 
central to the planning of new roads and to the siting of new logging, 
agricultural or mining projects. In spite of concerns voiced by anthropologists 
hired by the World Bank to evaluate the impact of development projects on 
indigenous populations (Price, 1989) substantial loans were provided by 
international institutions and MNCs for the construction of roads and dams, 
the digging of mines and the clearing of forest for ranching (Hecht et al., 
1989:116). Enticed by subsidies and tax breaks, international investors flocked 
to the region. Amazonian ‘development’ however, remained plagued with 
anxieties that the large sums allocated to grandiose projects in remote 
locations might merely fuel corruption. Projects, it was feared, might ‘remain 
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on paper’, as investors bribed officials to ‘turn a blind eye’. Ways of seeing 
were therefore needed that were not reliant on the corruptible eyes of local 
officials. Geographic Information Systems (GIS) appeared as the obvious 
technical fix in this quest for incorruptible vision. Thus, one of INPE’s main 
tasks during the 1970s-80s was to gather data on whether Amazonian 
development projects were indeed being carried out (Tardin et al., 1979). As a 
senior INPE scientist who had been involved in this enterprise put it: ‘How 
else could the government inspect such remote areas if not with satellites?’ 
(Interviewee/#72/2009)  
It is worth reflecting at this point on the illegibilities that are created by 
such apparatuses of visibility. It should be clear by what has been said so far, 
that under the logics of ‘sovereignty’ and ‘development’, deforestation did not 
register as a problem -other than in terms of possible risks to future wood 
production. (It was in line with this logic that the Brazilian Forestry Code was 
compiled in 1965 [Ahrens, 2007].) Nonetheless, by the early 1970s the term 
‘tropical deforestation’ was already emerging as an environmental issue with 
global consequences, and not simply as a matter of reliable timber supply. A 
UN report (Matthews et al, 1971) initiated a series of papers exploring the 
rainforest’s influence upon the global climate and its value as a ‘genetic 
reservoir’. Work by anthropologists (Meggers, 1971; Price, 1989), ecologists 
(Richards, 1970) and geographers (Denevan, 1973) provided compelling 
evidence regarding the effects of deforestation on wildlife and on indigenous 
populations. The Amazonian rainforest was no longer an impenetrable jungle 
waiting to be tamed by human enterprise, but a fragile ecosystem in need of 
protection.  
Initially, however, calls to protect the rainforest made little impact. 
Qualitative studies carried out by anthropologists were dismissed by 
government (natural) scientists and policy makers as ideologically 
antagonistic towards state-sponsored development (Schor, 2008). There was 
a widespread view among INPE scientists that the only rigorous, and thus 
admissible, data on Amazonian deforestation was that obtainable by means of 
satellite technologies: only those with access to such technology were able to 
make credible statements about the subject. Until the 1980s, most agencies 
using GIS were broadly aligned with the Brazilian government agenda. GIS 
data was therefore mainly used to undermine claims that the rainforest was in 
danger. Officials could dismiss environmentalist concerns and 
anthropological and biological studies by arguing that deforestation was 
limited and ultimately harmless (Bourne, 1978).  Similarly, the UN Food and 
Agriculture Foundation (FAO), one of few institutions with GIS capabilities, 
was equally dismissive of environmentalist concerns (Emmelin, 1972:136). 
FAOs (1981) assessment of tropical forests was thus presented as proof that 
deforestation was under control, and it was in any case a necessary step in the 
development of tropical countries. Fears of forest loss were ‘excessive and 
misdirected’ and environmentalists were being far too ‘speculative’ in their 
assessments of the relation between deforestation and global weather 
(Clayton, 1982). It is evident then, that technological apparatuses of visibility 
played a key role not only in facilitating the implementation of a 
developmentalist agenda but also in de-legitimating environmental(ist) 
concerns about the Amazon. 
The restoration of democracy in the 1980s brought in its wake an 
increased sensitivity to international criticism of the accumulating 
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environmental damage of the development agenda. Study after study, showed 
that deforestation had been systematically underestimated (Fearnside, 1982; 
Malingreau and Crompton, 1988). Scientific critics, we might say, began to 
use the official developmentalist apparatuses of data generation in order to 
make the fate of the Amazon visible in a different way. They were thus most 
successful when they used GIS to create their own mathematical projections of 
Amazonia’s future. Fearnside (1982) used INPE’s deforestation data for the 
years 1975 and 1978 to argue that deforestation was growing exponentially 
and that the Amazon rainforest could well disappear by the end of the century. 
Using the last Amazon-wide deforestation assessment then available (for the 
year 1978) together with some extensive but incomplete assessments for the 
years 1980 and 1983, World Bank economist Dennis Mahar (1989) argued 
that the growth of deforestation was in fact, exponential. 
 
“Landsat images were cited as proof [by the Brazilian government] that 
the environmentalists -some of whom had predicted the demise of the 
Amazonian forest by the end of the century -had greatly exaggerated 
their case (Denevan 1973). More recent data, however, make it clear 
that there was no cause for complacency. […] The 1988 figure is 
equivalent to 12 percent of Amazonia and is larger than France” 
(Mahar, 1989:7).   
Such predictions therefore ‘collide[d] with one of the Amazon’s great illusions: 




Figure 2: Annual deforestation rates estimated by PRODES/INPE and the year of 
creation of key policies and technologies. 
 
 
Following Mahar’s study, international banks suspended the disbursement of 
loans to the Brazilian government forcing a U-Turn on its policies towards the 
Amazon (Hecht and Cockburn, 1989). Furthermore, Grass-roots movements, 
such as that led by the rubber tapper Chico Mendes, were attracting 
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increasing attention in the international media. The 1988 assassination of 
Mendes and the publication of Space Shuttle pictures showing large areas of 
the Amazon on fire precipitated a political crisis (Gonc¸alves, 2005). Amidst 
the mounting international crisis, the government asked INPE to create 
PRODES, a new system based on orbital remote sensing with which to more 
accurately measure yearly deforestation rates (Figure 2). The aim of PRODES 
was two-fold. First, the government wanted to ‘demonstrate to the 
international community our [Brazil’s] concern with the environment’, as a 
senior politician who was one of the protagonists in these events explained 
(Interviewee/#7/2007). By creating a technological apparatus that would 
regularly monitor deforestation (instead of sporadically), the government 
would establish its credentials as a competent manager of the rainforest. The 
system was therefore expected to provide (what officials termed) ‘objective’ 
(quantitative) data to challenge Mahar’s projections (Tardin et al., 1989: 3). A 
senior INPE scientist involved in the development of the system summarised 
the political motivation thus: ‘Back then it was clear that PRODES was only 
about generating a number before an adventurer [i.e. critic] does so’ – 
Interviewee/ #35/2009). 
In addition to creating PRODES, the Brazilian government also made a 
number of constitutional and policy changes, inaugurating environmental 
education, establishing new national parks and, importantly, abolishing 
subsidies for cattle ranching, a key driver of Amazonian deforestation 
(Browder, 1988). The environmental law enforcement agency (IBAMA) was 
created to control deforestation in the region (Brasil, 1989: Art.44). 
Subsequent crises that took place in the 1990s and 2000s would also prompt 
similar reactions. In the wake of a spike in deforestation rates (1995), the 
Forest Code was revised with the ‘legal reserve’ increased from 50% to 80% 
for the rainforest biome. Thus, owners of properties located in the rainforest 
must retain 80% of the original forest (in addition to any ‘Areas of Special 
Preservation’ such as riparian zones, slopes and mountain tops) with only the 
remaining 20% available for farming or ranching. In 2003, Environment 
Minister Marina Silva (herself the daughter of Amazonian rubber tappers) 
made PRODES satellite images and deforestation maps (formerly classified as 
matters of state security) available on the Internet. The same period saw the 
inauguration of a number of new systems, notably DETER which provides 
IBAMA agents with fortnightly reports of new deforestation. Satellite data 
thus became important for all those, whether within or outside the state 
apparatus (including NGOs) seeking to advance sustainability agendas. 
INPE’s monitoring systems, which for much of their history had been held 
under suspicion by NGOs and members of the scientific community 
(Fearnside, 1993) have therefore come to be regarded as the ‘envy of the 
world’ (Kintisch, 2007: 536). INPE has become one of the most cited sources 
of deforestation data, featuring in many academic articles and NGO reports 
(Fearnside, 2005; Greenpeace, 2008). Many of the former critics of INPE now 
defend the institution against government attempts to outsource monitoring 
activities to private companies (Stokstad, 2017) or the interference of the 
current Bolsonaro Administration (e.g. BBC, 2019; Spring and Eisenhammer, 
2019). 
The emerging emphasis on ‘conservation’ and the associated 
redefinition of (unauthorised) forest clearing as an environmental crime 
(‘deforestation’) does not however displace developmentalist agendas (e.g. 
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Simmons et al, 2019). As we shall see, both these ‘rationalities’ (Miller and 
Rose, 1990) and their associated modes of knowing and ordering (Law, 1994) 
still co-inhabit the infrastructures of administration and continue to mediate 
the Amazon qua both a fragile ecosystem in need of conservation and a 
perennial resource frontier. 
The view from the ground 
 
‘An infrastructure occurs’, argue Star and Ruhleder (1996:114), ‘when the 
tension between local and global is resolved’. What are then the tensions 
between global and local, how are they are problematized, and how do they 
get (or fail to be) resolved? In his classic study of the work practices of 
‘street-level bureaucrats’ (such as police officers or social workers) Lipsky 
(1980:xiii) argued that ‘the routines they establish, and the devices they 
invent to cope with uncertainties and work pressures effectively become 
the public policies they carry out’ (emphasis in original). Modern 
administration, Weber (1978) notes, typically operates by dis-placing the 
events it seeks to manage from their original social contexts to the secluded 
physical space of ‘the Office’ where they can be (impartially) processed in 
line with the rules of the institution (Becker and Clark, 2001). The local 
actor-networkings of street-level bureaucrats appear to short-circuit this 
process. The de facto ‘de-coupling’ (Meyer and Rowan, 1977) of local 
practices from formal policies is highly problematic for managers who find 
it difficult to rein in their agents’ discretion and to direct it in line with 
institutional goals (Prottas, 1978). In the case of, what we might call, 
‘jungle bureaucrats’ -those agents tasked with enforcing the law and 
implementing environmental policies in Amazonia- this problem is, if 
anything, more acute.  
The profile of the forest rangers recruited by IBAMA following its 
creation in 1989, was a world away from that of the well-educated, well-
renumerated officials in Brasília. The majority had only an elementary 
education and had been recruited from the local population on the basis of 
their experience of the forest. Pay was low and resources few. Rangers were 
suspected to be much closer to the values and views of the farmers they 
had to inspect than to those of the distant bureaucrats managing them. 
Many of those rangers had formerly worked for IBDF, an agency that had 
been created to facilitate the colonization of the forest. As a senior official 
put it, ‘asking IBDF rangers to enforce deforestation control laws was like 
asking pyromaniacs to control forest fires’ (Interviewee/#23/2009). It is 
therefore hardly surprising that for much of its history IBAMA has been 
afflicted by a succession of corruption scandals with, for instance, rangers 
bribed to ignore (unauthorised) deforestation or being involved in the 
illegal sale of logging and forest-clearance authorisations. Consequently 
IBAMA acquired the reputation of an inefficient and corruption-ridden 
organization, a notoriety that it has found difficult to shake.  
There is a by now extensive body of research that attempts to 
document how the discretional powers of street-level bureaucrats are (or 
are not) being eroded by the introduction of digital technologies (e.g. 
Bovens and Zouridis, 2002; Jorna and Wagenaar, 2007). Indeed more and 
more of the work carried out by ‘human actors’ comes to be ‘delegated’, as 
Latour (1992) would put it, to technological systems (Ribes et al. 2013). 
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When we seek to trace how exactly the various labours of deforestation-
detection are, as it were, ‘passed around’ between different categories of 
actor a complex picture emerges. In the days before the current generation 
of GIS, fines would have been administered in the course of site 
inspections with the ranger in the role of ‘witness to the act’ (similar to a 
traffic warden issuing a ticket). The infraction document would identify the 
property using locally recognised reference points (e.g. ‘near the tall nut 
tree’; ‘by the river bend’) and calculate the deforested area again in 
approximate terms using the ‘olhometro’–a colloquialism derived from 
olho (eye) and metro (meter). Such documents, however, were often 
unable to successfully bridge the geographical and cultural distance 
between, for instance, forest and courtroom.  Their labours of detection 
would often unravel when challenged by landlords’ attorneys and their 
hired experts. For example, landscape references often lacked sufficient 
specificity and could be fitted to many other forest locations. In addition, 
the rangers’ impartiality as witnesses was always in question given the 
agency’s reputation for corruption. With the development of the new data 
infrastructures however, GPS coordinates have replaced local references 
and ‘olhometric’ calculations. Since the introduction of DETER, all fines 
for deforestation and the accompanying technical reports include satellite 
images. 
Accordingly, IBAMA has refocused its recruitment to computer-literate 
graduates. The number of rangers with higher degrees (‘analysts’ in agency 
terminology) has therefore grown substantially while the number of 
‘technicians’ (those with ‘merely’ local/practical knowledge) has declined 
(IBAMA, 2008; Jackson, 2015). IBAMA HQ now offers GIS upskilling 
sessions and advice via Skype to those working in the Amazon. Agency 
officials would often describe the period before remote sensing as a time when 
IBAMA had been ‘blind’. Enforcement was entirely dependent on ‘luck’ and 
the technicians ‘forestry instincts’-i.e. practice-acquired intuition. Rangers 
would patrol particular areas where illegal deforestation was known to take 
place but, given the size of the areas in question, it was more in hope than 
expectation. As a ranger put it: ‘Before GIS technology it was much more 
difficult to do our work. [W]e would go to a certain region…door-to-door and 
hope to get some information that might lead us to the place of a crime’. 
(Interviewee/#16/2008) 
While IBAMA maintains a toll-free ‘greenline’ for anonymous tip-offs, 
such information is frequently misleading or insufficiently detailed. In 
addition, since regional managers lack detailed knowledge of the municipality 
where they operate, they would often be unable to position their agents 
effectively. Satellite-based yearly rates may have provided reliable indicators 
of deforestation, but this data was not timely enough to be of much practical 
use. In pre-DETER times, a senior official explained, ‘INPE’s monitoring 
systems used to take almost two years to release deforestation data, when it 
was too late to plan anything’ (Interviewee/#11/2008). The introduction of 
the new technologies at local level, and the frequent updating of deforestation 
data, argued a senior official, was an ‘eye opener’. IBAMA, ‘started being able 
to see deforestation while it was happening, and not [merely] the final result 
of deforestation’(Interviewee/#48/2009).   
Officials interviewed in the course of this research stressed that new 
infrastructure has not only facilitated the increase in the number of fines 
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administered but also, and crucially, they have brought about an 
improvement in their ‘legal quality’. In other words, an improvement in the 
ability to document the evidence, so as to better establish deforestation as a 
legal fact (environmental crime) in distant offices and courthouses. As an 
IBAMA agent stated: 
‘in most cases the old processes failed to [properly] identify either the 
person responsible [for the deforestation] or the site…Since we started 
to clearly identify [in the notices of infraction]…[both] the exact 
location and the authorship of the crimes…the situation has improved 
a lot. (Interviewee/#02tv/2018)  
 
This enhancement of the ‘legal quality’ of the documents renders them, 
according to our interlocutors, better able to function as ‘boundary objects. 
in Star’s and Griesemer’s (1989) sense of the term, between inter alia field 
and office, courtroom and forest clearing.  
 
Figure 3: Examples of an infraction notice which manually records GPS 
coordinates to calculate the deforested area (left) and (right) a contemporary 
notice which utilises satellite images and GIS. 
 
The improvement in the infraction reports’ ‘legal’ -or to borrow from 
Latour (1987) ‘mediating’- qualities is more than a question of an improved 
ability to accurately re-present the facts of the case. Figure 3 shows two 
infraction reports from SEMA-MT the environmental agency of the State of 
Mato Grosso with responsibilities similar (at state level) to that of IBAMA. 
The document on the left uses GPS coordinates (and not the ranger’s 
olhometro) to calculate the deforested area. The ‘new style’ report on the 
right uses satellite images and GIS. If, as Weber (1978:975) once argued, 
bureaucracy works ‘more perfectly’ the more it succeeds in ‘dehumanizing’ 
itself, then the handwritten document on the left has been less than 
successful in this regard. When compared with the one on the right it 
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appears still enmired in human subjectivity and (corruptible) personal 
judgment. The former document may well contain exactly the same data 






Satellite-imaging and GIS-generated data have become central to the agency’s 
resource allocation practices and to the planning of missions. Data on 
deforestation rates and the number of fines and the area of embargoed 
properties, allow senior officials to evaluate the work of local offices and to 
assess the performance of local managers. Similarly, GIS is utilised by local 
managers to coordinate the work of their forest rangers, and by the rangers 
themselves to facilitate cooperation with the agency’s attorneys in regional 
and central offices. It is worth emphasising however, that by itself, a satellite 
image is not sufficient proof that an environmental crime has indeed been 
committed.  In order to establish deforestation as a legal fact, rangers need to 
visit the site identified and establish, among other things, ‘ownership of the 
act’. For example, that it was a deliberate (not accidental fire) on the land of 
this particular landlord (not in a neighbouring estate, nor in ‘no man’s land’- 
land ownership remains nebulous in Amazonia).   
In stark contrast with the past, rangers today rarely leave their local 
offices without specific instructions as to where they are to go. For short 
missions with few targets, local managers will enter only a set of geographical 
coordinates into the GPS devices used by rangers. For more complex missions, 
however, a ranger with GIS expertise (an ‘analyst’) will generate a ‘logistic 
map’ under the supervision of the local manager to guide the rangers in the 
field. A typical week-long patrol begins with the allocation of a set of ‘points’ 
to be checked to a team of rangers who, together with a military escort, will 
then set off in a group of two or three off-road vehicles.  It is the job of the 
rangers to physically locate and ‘characterise’ the specific deforestation 
indicated in the satellite image (see Figure 4). Physically accessing the 
particular deforestation ‘point’ shown in the data is not an easy task in spite of 
all the technological gadgetry. It requires considerable local knowledge and 
ability to interpret the terrain and identify clues to potential access routes. 
Once the right deforestation has been ‘located’ its characterisation can 
commence.  The labour of ‘characterisation’ begins with the recording of the 
location and extent of the deforested area using GPS. Rangers also compile a 
detailed photographic record of the state of the terrain on the date of the 
inspection. These photographs enable the characterisation of a particular 
deforestation as an intentional act (rather than say, the result of an accidental 
fire) by documenting inter alia the scars left by the tractor-dragged chains 
used to break the burnt vegetation and the planting of seeds. A key part of 
‘characterisation’ is the identification of the landlord, the presumed agent of 
deforestation. This can be tricky in an area where lands are often occupied 
illegally and land titles forged. The following research diary excerpt describes 
such an inspection:    
 
‘At about 08:30 the caravan leaves the road in order to follow an 
unpaved path across the soybean fields. Valeria is in the first car 
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leading the pack. Guiding her is a hand-drawn childlike map sent by an 
anonymous denouncer. After going back and forth, and asking a not-
very-collaborative farmer for guidance, we arrive at a small house by 
the river. A couple of old farmers are sitting at a table in the veranda 
trimming a pile of beans. Valeria approaches one of the farmers while 
the rest of our group starts taking pictures of the area by the riverside 
which shows clear evidence of a degraded Area of Permanent 
Preservation. The old farmer protests that he is only an employee and 
the patrão (boss) is not here. While this is going on, a middle-aged 
man arrives in a SUV. The old farmer tells us that the new arrival is the 
landlord's brother. ‘Who has reported me?’ the man shouts at us. The 
rangers look at him but no-one replies. He looks nervous and starts 
talking to a ranger. After he has understood that he (or his brother) 
have illegally deforested an Area of Permanent Preservation he 
protests: ‘But that was ‘opened’ more than 6 years ago!’ ‘That maybe so; 
replies the ranger curtly, ‘however, the law dates back to 1965’. After 
that, the man becomes uncooperative. When asked to confirm that he is 
the owner's brother, he replies: ‘Uhm, ehm, I'm just a relative’.  
 
Later, Valeria was able to obtain some further information, check his 
documents and write a notification requesting that the owner of the 
property should attend at the IBAMA offices in Sinop to show any 




Figure 4: On the left, a group of rangers and soldiers approach the landlord’s 
agent (far left). On the right, an IBAMA agent writes a notification to the 
landlord - the first step towards the imposition of a deforestation fine. 
 
 
Following a mission, IBAMA agents will focus on producing the 
documentation and to pass it on to the landlords and their lawyers, as well as 
to IBAMA attorneys and senior officials located in Cuiabá, Brasília or some 
other faraway location. The task, however, must be performed in such a way 
as to display clear signs of ‘proper procedure’ (Zimmerman, 1969: i.e. 
objective assessment of the evidence as opposed to personal bias or malicious 
prosecution). Herein lies the official answer to the ‘relative’s’ question ‘who 
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has reported me?’: there was no need for a denunciation. It is the ‘eye in the 
sky’ that sees everything. But, of course, as we already know, he had been 
reported. Nevertheless, when the file is compiled -to paraphrase Latour’s 
(1987:175) Janus- the satellite image ‘will appear as the driving force’ behind 
the inspection.  
The function of satellite data is twofold: to account for the detection of 
deforestation and, also, to make visible its ‘dynamic’ by reference to satellite 
images of that same locality obtained in previous years. As Ricoeur (1990) has 
noted, effective sense-making presupposes and requires a plot in which each 
the different elements (e.g. satellite images, photographs taken in situ, 
documents, testimonies) is allocated an explanatory function in a causal 
narrative. Causal narratives however, are at the same time attributions of 
agency. Not only the agency of the ‘author’ of the environmental crime, but 
also the agency of the ‘sociotechnical assemblage’ (Amin, 2014) responsible 
for the detection of the crime. In these plots, rangers typically figure as but the 
human components cum Derridian (1976) ‘supplements’ of an authoritative 
techno-logical system. Their corruptible eyes are increasingly displaced by 
new machineries of vision seemingly able to capture the data devoid of 
subjective interference. As we have seen, the often painstaking, forensic and 
detective work performed by rangers in order to establish both the ‘nature’ 
and ‘authorship’ of the crime remains key to the effective operation of all 
technological systems. At the same time this dependence tends to be, so to 
speak, placed ‘under erasure’ (Derrida, 1976) in official accountings of the 
process. This is assumed to release the ‘facts of the matter’ from their 
continuing indebtedness to individual agents and local knowledges thus 
rendering them better able to survive any forthcoming ‘trials of strength’ 
(Latour, 1987) in the - often drawn out - legal process.  
 
Systems, delegations and management control 
 
In the new information ecology enacted by means of the new technologies, 
rangers are the objects, as well as the agents, of surveillance. As will be 
recalled, corruption -and accusations of corruption- have blighted the work of 
IBAMA ever since its inception. Officials do worry about the possibility that 
their rangers might be involved in corrupt dealings. Whilst in the past, 
individual rangers had considerable discretion to follow ‘gut feelings. local 
managers using GIS are now able to specify which sites are to be inspected 
and to review the fines administered. Rangers are thus increasingly denied the 
discretion to ‘negotiate’ with farmers or to ask for bribes. Unsurprisingly, local 
IBAMA managers were rather guarded regarding such uses of the system. It is 
understandably difficult for managers to explicitly state that they distrust 
their subordinates. It was only in the course of more informal conversations 
with agency officials that corruption anxieties would come to the surface. In 
the words of a former manager:  
 
‘In Brazil you should never send an agent to the field for 
whatever reason if you do not have a way to control his 
actions.…The System gives me the size for each individual piece 
of deforestation. I would then tell the agent: ‘I want you to go in 
these five farms shown in the map and bring me back the fine. If 
you find other deforestation, you can do it, but I want you to 
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bring me at least these five’. In this way, we have taken away 
from the agent’s hand the decision about whether to fine 
someone or not, because it was already decided by the System’ 
(Interviewee/#03tv/2018)  
 
The satellite image thus serves to both initiate and legitimate the rangers’ 
actions in the field.  
 
There is typically a hiatus that arises between, what we might call, the 
‘ideal logic’ of technological systems (a key source of their enchantment) and 
the manner in which they are operated in practice. Indeed, there was an 
evident gap between how rangers used the technology and scientists’ and 
senior officials’ expectations of how the technology should be used. In 
discussions, Space Agency scientists would commonly assumed that the 
supply of ‘real time’ deforestation data (DETER) meant that forest rangers 
would inspect the areas identified as soon as the data became available in the 
System in order to catch perpetrators ‘chainsaw in hand’. This (panoptic) view 
was also shared by many senior officials in both IBAMA HQ and the Ministry 
of the Environment in Brasília. For instance, an IBAMA official responsible 
for strategy argued that:  
 
‘[Before DETER] we could not interrupt on-going deforestation. This 
was the problem at the beginning of the use of satellite images. With 
DETER there was a great improvement. We started receiving pointers 
from DETER every 15 days. It says ‘something is going on here, it is 
changing here’ and INPE gives this information to IBAMA. It was a 
jump, a paradigm change. After that we started to work with very short 
time strategies. And then people could go to the field and interrupt on-
going deforestation.’ (Interviewee/#48/2009).  
 
To enable local managers to plan their missions in line with the (presumed) 
‘real-time’ logic of the system, scientists in Brasília have devised the ‘priorities 
map’. Every 15 days, scientists (re)calculate the ranking of priorities for law 
enforcement drawing upon DETER data and other system information. 
‘Priorities maps’ are then sent to IBAMA offices in the Amazon where, it is 
expected, will be used by local managers to ‘interrupt deforestation’ as it 
happens.  
Observation of work practices in the field however, reveals a rather 
different picture. From a local manager’s viewpoint, it is not feasible to inspect 
deforestation points as soon as these have made their appearance on DETER.  
IBAMA funding has always been low, so local managers usually large areas to 
oversee with only one or two teams of rangers at their disposal. They therefore 
plan missions in ways that allow the inspection of as many deforestation 
points as possible in the course of a single patrol. Deforestation reports are 
typically left to ‘accumulate’ for a few months before it is worthwhile 
despatching a team to an area. As a forest ranger explained in the course of an 
informal conversation, 
 
‘In Brasília they have this utopia that we should be able to get the guy 
with the chainsaw in hand thanks to real-time monitoring systems, but 
in reality it is very far from it’ (Fieldnote/#19/2008).  
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Limited resources mean that local offices are unable to inspect all the 
deforestation pointed out by DETER. Instead of being in urgent need of yet 
more deforestation data in order to improve their work, the system is already 
creating a backlog that far exceeds IBAMA’s local capabilities. Furthermore, 
and in contrast to the centrally-held view that that the most efficient strategy 
is to visit the most recently detected deforestation sites, local managers 
reported that they plan missions so as to ‘show the presence of the state’ 
throughout the territory under their jurisdiction. They explained that they aim 
to visit every municipality at least once every six months in order to 
underscore to the local community that the state is ‘watching them’ even when 
the municipality does not show a particularly high deforestation rate. 
Visibility to the state is, in other words, only credible if the state itself is 
visible.  
In addition, the work of inspection involves the juggling of scarce 
resources in the light of the contingencies of unfolding missions. Managers 
would explain that it is not uncommon to start a mission with one aim and 
then change it in response to events unfolding and incoming demands from 
other agencies. For example: 
 
‘I sent a team to check some properties in Colniza, but that I also 
received a request from FUNAI [National Indian Foundation]. Since 
…indigenous lands have priority, I asked [the rangers] to check that 
first. After two days, we were not able to find the issues pointed out by 
FUNAI. However, we did find 70 logs in the region. Today we have just 
found another lot with more than 300 logs....[W]e always have to take 
decisions on the spur of the moment.’(Personal 
communication#2/2009).  
 
The disenchantments of technology 
Rangers would often voice their scepticism regarding the relevance of systems 
designed in distant ‘centres of calculation’ to their own work needs: 
‘[T]he problem in Brasília is that often they develop technologies that 
nobody asked for, like this electronic fine, while the technologies that 
we really need they don’t develop. The guys in Brasília don’t know our 
reality and don’t like coming here because they think it’s the end of the 
world’ (Fieldnote #19/2008)  
 
The target of the ranger’s discontent was, what we might call, a class of GIS-
based monitoring and registry systems exemplified at local level by Mato 
Grosso’s Environmental Licensing System for Rural Properties (Sistema de 
Licenciamento Ambiental de Propriedades Rurais or SLAPR) and, more 
recently, at a national level, by the Environmental Rural Registry (Cadastro 
Ambiental Rural or CAR). The central problem that these seek to address is 
that even though advanced satellite-based systems such as DETER has been 
tracking Amazonian deforestation, what they cannot ‘show’ is the legal 
responsibility for the land where ‘environmental crimes’ have appeared. ‘If 
you have a speed trap’ argues The Economist (2013)’but the cars have no 
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numbers, that’s useless’. The objective is, as a senior Ministry of Environment 
official put it, to give ‘a name and surname’ to deforestation. Giving ‘a name 
and surname’ to deforestation is, as we have seen, the job of the forest 
rangers. As will be recalled however, resources allow only a relatively small 
number of the sites identified to be physically inspected. Furthermore, as we 
have argued, much of the actual work of detection, that the rangers do 
perform tends -to use Derrida’s (1976) term- to be placed ‘under erasure’ in 
order to uphold particular idea(l)s of ‘proper procedure’ (Zimmerman, 1969). 
As a result, those back in the ‘centres of calculation’ (including senior officials) 
tend to have a rather limited understanding of the rangers’ actual practices 
and, consequently, unrealistic expectations of the instrumental efficacy of 
particular digital infrastructures. The record of SLAPR is a case in point.  
Created in the late 1990s and funded by the G7 (PPG7) and the United 
Nations Development Program (UNDP) SLAPR was conceived as a three-
stage system. In the licensing stage, the georeferenced borders and land-use 
of each individual property are registered in the system. In this process, those 
who have deforested more than the percentage allowed or to have done so in 
Areas of Permanent Preservation, (may) have to pay a fine and sign an 
agreement to restore forest cover. In the monitoring stage, each property is 
monitored using satellite and GIS technology in order to identify any changes 
in forest cover. Finally, in the enforcement stage those detected to be 
deforesting illegally would, not unlike The Economist’s (2013) drivers caught 
in a speed trap, receive their fine by post. Such artefacts then, enact an orderly 
vision of the Amazon where clearly demarcated properties have stable 
boundaries and legal owners. Let us note at this point that although they 
theoretically, dispense with the need of in situ inspections allowing 
deforestation control to be carried out ‘at a distance, this ambition was 
dismissed by rangers as unrealistic. Such systems, they pointed out, cannot 
assign legal responsibility since the owner is not necessarily the agent of the 
act in a land where squatting and conflicting claims are common. For 
example, as an IBAMA agent put it: 
‘The novelty of last year was the use of police reports by farmers to 
protect themselves from us. The guy sets fire to his property to clear the 
land for the cattle, and then goes to the police to say it was arson [by 
persons unknown].’ 
 
It is only in in situ inspections, it was noted, that tractor tracks and grass 
seeds can be found and the true identity of the crime (and the criminal) 
exposed.   
Even though, as one of the system’s creators put it in an interview, they 
only ever issued ‘a few [electronic] fines as a test’, SLAPR was widely 
proclaimed -by researchers, funding agencies and policy-makers alike- as the 
future of deforestation control (e.g. Wertz-Kanounnikoff, 2005). Fearnside 
(2003) described SLAPR as demonstrating, for the first time, how 
governments could control deforestation. Similarly, and in addition to 
providing non-refundable loans, the World Bank, presented SLAPR to other 
tropical countries as an exemplar of ‘best practice’. PPG7, another funder of 




Figure 5: Forest-Deforestation classification of a Mato Grosso farm. 
 
 
Reasons to doubt the efficacy of SLAPR become evident when we examine 
more closely how ‘objectivity and transparency’ were actually accomplished 
within the system. One example: Mato Grosso state officials tended to allow 
GIS experts hired by landowners to interpret images of their property. While 
senior officials tend to refer to satellite images as mirrors of reality, such 
images do not ‘speak for themselves’ but require considerable interpretive 
labour. Indeed, as we found out in the course of this research, satellite images 
typically provide considerable room for differing interpretations of what is, or 
is not, ‘forest’. Consider for instance the map-image of a SLAPR 
environmental license shown in fig.5. The hired expert has drawn a line (in 
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white) separating forested from de-forested areas. There are at least three 
areas however, which are here classified as forest (circled) but where the 
prevalence of darker tones on the satellite image suggests that the area is 
severely degraded, possibly as a result of selective logging. Current and former 
officials confirmed the prevalence of such practices. For instance, a GIS expert 
who had held a senior management position at SEMA argued that the 
blurriness of the satellite images in relation to degraded or small-forested 
areas, such as the ones adjacent to rivers, allowed hired GIS experts to 
generate the representations they favoured (Interviewee/#28/2008). When 
questioned directly, a SEMA official (while clearly uncomfortable with the 
question) responded that they rarely tended to challenge such interpretations 
of satellite images.  
Clearly, the ways in which these lines are drawn on the images also 
index networks of socio-economic privilege: it is the larger landowners that 
can afford to employ their own experts. Furthermore, to paraphrase Garfinkel 
(1984:186), there are, arguably, ‘good organizational reasons’ for such 
‘looking but not seeing’. The key performance indicator for SLAPR was the 
number of properties registered, not the deforestation levels on these 
properties. Indeed, as a number of studies have shown, more deforestation 
was taking place inside than outside the SLAPR (Rajao et al, 2012). 
Nevertheless, the Ministry of the Environment officially adopted 
SLAPR as the desired standard for the Amazon. It supported the development 
of a series of similar infrastructures culminating in the creation of the nation-
wide Environmental Rural Registry (CAR) currently in its implementation 
stage. CAR is said to herald a new era of data-driven development and 
environmental governance by facilitating ‘control, monitoring, environmental 
and economic planning and the fight against deforestation’ (Art.29, Lei 
12651/12; Decreto7830/2012). CAR requires the registration of all rural 
properties (and of the ways the land is being used) into its database. Once 
‘who owns what’ has been registered, then satellite monitoring in conjunction 
with the georeferencing of property boundaries will, it is expected, reveal the 
compliance of each property with the requirements of the Forest Code and 
hold property owners properly accountable for any illegal deforestation 
detected on their land. The emphasis then, was on the system’s technical 
‘potential’ which, it was assumed, will be seamlessly translated into practice. 
 
In the Amazon, as we have seen, it is always difficult to know who is 
responsible for any particular act of deforestation as rural properties are often 
unregistered or subject to multiple, contradictory (and forged) claims 
(Holston, 1991: Campbell, 2015a;b). Such claims are colloquially known as 
‘grilagem’ (from grilo = cricket), a reference to the use of crickets to 
artificially age counterfeit documents. These practices are, so to speak, but the 
bureaucratic refractions of an oft-violent world, where lands are squatted and 
re-possessed, property boundaries drawn and re-drawn and rivals chased 
away. (On the dynamics of land disputes see Simmons, 2002; 2004; 2005). 
Against this backdrop, it is perhaps premature to evaluate CAR’s ambition to 
‘fix a singular vision of territory in a standardized database of knowledge’ 
(Campbell, 2015b: 158). Nevertheless, there are already indications that at 
least some of the practices of ‘looking but not seeing’ (as our interlocutors 
would put it) that afflicted SLAPR may now be in the process of colonizing 
CAR.  
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The evolution of infrastructures, Star and Ruhleder (1996) remind us, 
is typically beset by various ‘double binds’. As had been the case with SLAPR, 
CAR evaluation practices by the Federal Government and donor agencies have 
also focused on the number of properties registered, rather than on any effects 
on deforestation. There is evidence that managers were purposefully not 
fining the farmers joining the system precisely in order to facilitate enrollment 
-thus perpetuating practices of ‘looking but not seeing’. An NGO 
representative reported to us the following comment, allegedly made by a 
senior manager in the State of Pará when questioned by the Minister of the 
Environment (on the basis of a 2014 interim study by one of the authors): 
‘You have to decide what you want us to do. Either we attract the farmers to 
join CAR or we start issuing fines to them’. As an IBAMA ranger summed up 
this institutional double bind:  
 
‘The problem today is that the state only has the stick [to curb 
deforestation] and no real carrot. Because if the state had a carrot the 
farmer would have joined CAR independently of the presence of a stick. 
Therefore, the carrot dangled by the state today is the absence of a 




Infrastructures, anthropologists caution, ‘refract rather than merely translate’ 
political projects (Reeves, 2017: 717; Harvey and Knox, 2012; Dalakoglou, 
2012). Perhaps ironically - given the widespread currency of ‘transparency’ 
discourses - images, and the material infrastructures for their production and 
circulation are often central to how such ‘refractory’ effects are engendered 
(e.g. Strathern, 2000; Styhre 2010). Hull (2012: Ch5) for instance, in his 
ethnography of urban planning in Islamabad, describes how the circulation of 
maps showing where planners intend to build particular (sect-specific) 
mosques incite squatters from other sects to preemptively occupy those very 
sites. A political scheme to combat sectarianism ends up having the opposite 
effect.  
The use of geospatial technologies in environmental protection is, as we 
have seen, not immune to such ‘refractions’. For example whilst there is some 
evidence that small farmers registered with CAR in Pará and Mato Grosso had 
initially reduced their ‘land-clearing’ activities, once it became apparent that 
the system was not being used to fine transgressors, the rate of deforestation 
on such properties rapidly increased (Azevedo et al, 2017). So while CAR’s 
enrolment strategy has been a major success with over 6 million farms 
registered (representing most of the target area) lax enforcement has meant 
that by 2016 over half of all Amazonian deforestation was taking place inside 
the registry (Watanabe, 2017). In 2016, in response to rises in deforestation, 
senior officials from Pará, Mato Grosso and IBAMA mentioned that they had 
now started to use CAR to issue fines remotely. Even though this was a pilot 
with only about 500 fines issued by each of these agencies, it immediately ran 
into political opposition. A Mato Grosso official reported that in mid-2016, 
under a new secretary, the team that issued CAR-based fines was disbanded. 
Thus, in order to safeguard IBAMA’s CAR-based enforcement operation, 
internally known as ‘Remote Control’, a senior official reported to us that the 
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(then) Environment Minister had instructed that the operation be kept secret. 
Reports of its existence were bound to incite the wrath of the increasingly 
powerful (in a stagnant economy) ruralistas in Congress. Furthermore, an 
informal conversation an IBAMA official revealed that the current Minister of 
Environment, Ricardo Salles, ordered the suspension of the use of CAR to 
remotely issue fines. This, and the suspension of various key policies informed 
by geospatial data led to a drastic reduction in both remote and in situ law 
enforcement activities, leading to a 30% leap in deforestation rates recorded 
between 2018 and 2019 (see Figure 2).  
Plagued by conflicting demands and riven by contradictory 
imperatives, information infrastructures, however technologically 
sophisticated, always ran the danger of becoming instruments not of ‘factual’ 
governance but of official ‘unknowledge’ (Mathews, 2011). ‘Looking but not 
seeing’ facilitates the documentation of unregistered property therefore 
achieving one objective of the system at the expense of another; combating 
deforestation.  
Images and inscriptions are often, even routinely, ‘mobilised’ (Latour, 
1987) for purposes that flatly contradict the rationales of the systems that had 
generated them. This becomes evident in the ways in which landowners 
frequently seek to utilize the agency granted to documents in administrative 
infrastructures in order to divert the process of documentation to their own 
purposes. As already mentioned property relations in Amazonia are often 
‘founded on fraud, informal debts, violence, and opportunism’ (Campbell, 
2015a: 159). Against this backdrop CAR was explicitly set up as a system of 
environmental protection and not a vehicle for the ‘regularisation’ of property. 
It therefore tolerates the registration of overlapping property claims: In a 
study of 150,000 CAR registrations in the state of Pará, 108,000 were found 
to overlap (48,000 by 100%) with other properties. The extent of such 
‘overlaps’ amounted to more than 14 million hectares (the size of England). In 
spite of the stated intention to, so to speak, ‘bypass’ the messiness of 
conflicting land claims, CAR remains deeply entangled in them. A range of 
actors from land-grabbers (grileiros), to various municipalities (purveyors of 
the popular slogan ‘join CAR so that the Government will guarantee your 
land’) have re-framed the registration process in exactly these terms. For 
farmers, CAR registration officially inscribes their claim to a given piece of 
land making it possible, in due course, for grilagem documents to become 
genuine land titles. As might be expected, large landowners (‘grandes’) are the 
most adept in the performance of these labours of manipulation. They are able 
for instance, to ‘launder’ estates over 2500 hectares (the upper legal limit that 
can be recorded) via the registration of multiple properties, ostensibly owned 
by small farmers (pequenos) whose informal debts the large landowners hold. 
Seen in this light, the artefactual agency of systems like CAR (Passoth et al, 
2012) appears to recede in practice revealing the various ‘operators and the 
manoeuvres that lie behind’ it (Perez, 2016: 218)  
 
Conclusions and afterthoughts 
 
The Amazonian rainforest remains the most closely observed in the world. 
Over many decades the Brazilian state has assembled a complex 
sociotechnical apparatus in order to monitor forest loss. Such information 
infrastructures operate however at the intersection of mutually interfering 
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political demands, incommensurable goals, and competing organizational 
logics. The ways in which SLAPR and CAR function in practice resemble not 
so much the workings of the ‘enchanted infrastructures’ envisaged, and still 
rhetorically invoked, by their sponsors, but rather shifting and unstable 
network formations.  
It is worth recalling here the notion of ‘looking without seeing’ which 
our interlocutors would often use to name the pathologies of ostensibly 
‘panoptic’ (Foucault, 1979) systems. If, as Comaroff and Comaroff (2003:288) 
argue, it is now all but axiomatic that ‘to see is to know’, then knowing what 
not to see and thus what not to know, becomes indispensable social 
knowledge. Anthropologists sometimes use the term ‘unknowledge’ 
(Mathews, 2011) for those forms of knowledge which are, as it were, to be in-
attended to in order to facilitate the smooth running of particular political-
administrative projects and systematizations. Research in legal studies and in 
the sociology of government have highlighted the role of active non-knowing 
and non-enforcement as a technique of governance -when laws and 
regulations ‘are officially present’ but remain unenforced (Huisman, 2019:172; 
Gilbert, 2015). These can range from immigration laws in US ‘sanctuary cities’ 
(Martínez et al, 2017) to rental housing regulations in the Netherlands 
(Huisman, 2019). Seen in this light, the sociomaterial apparatuses of 
deforestation detection constitute particular sorts of ‘boundary objects’ (Star 
and Griesemer, 1989): conduits through which legality and illegality are 
allowed to leak into one another. We have seen how the various ‘orderings’ 
(Law, 1994) of development and conservation; neoliberalism and ecology, 
uneasily cohabit and parasitize one another. While precarious, incomplete and 
riven by contradictions, such infrastructures ‘hold together, as it were, by 
systematically ‘disattending’ to the logic of the other order’ (Brown and 
Reavey, 2017). Thus, the recently elected (2018) Bolsonaro administration 
with its ‘neoliberal’ emphasis on economic ‘development’ in Amazonia, is 
encouraging, as The Economist (2019:15) notes, ‘a large amount of 
deforestation, by not enforcing the laws that prohibit it’. To this effect, the 
new environment minister Ricardo Salles, has removed 21 of IBAMA’s 27 state 
heads in a ‘clear out’ of the agency. At the same time, the head of INPE was 
forced to resign for producing data that showed rapid rises in deforestation: 
for looking and seeing ‘like an NGO’ (e.g. Spring and Eisenhammer, 2019; 
BBC, 2019).  
 
By tracking the labours of attention and in-attention and the associated 
practices of knowing and unknowing, we can begin to understand the 
moments when, and the processes by means of which, one form of order(ing) 
transits into, or is usurped by, another. Such an understanding, we propose, is 
key to making sense of the current predicament of the Amazon now feared to 
be near a tipping point at which it will be longer able to generate its own rainfall 
(see Salazar et al 2007; Walker et al, 2009; The Economist, 2019) and of the 
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